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Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: 
Nationalism Versus Equal Protection 
Howard L. Biddulph* 
Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika bequeathed to the 
successor republics of the former Soviet Union a reform 
commitment toward full religious liberty.' The religious liberty 
laws enacted during the Perestroika Era by the Soviet 
government and its subordinate republics were retained by the 
new post-Soviet independent states in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarud2 
More liberal policies toward religious activity resulted, 
however, in the rise of a number of new confessions in Ukraine, 
Russia, Belarus' and some of the other post-Soviet states. 
Nationalist forces began to demand the state protection of the 
traditional churches in Russia and Ukraine against this 
expanding religious pluralism, by pressing for amendments to 
the original enactments on religious l i b e r t ~ . ~  
* Howard L. Biddulph is currently teaching in the Department of Political 
Science a t  Brigham Young University. He previously taught a t  University of 
Victoria in Canada and Rutgers University. During the years 1991-94, he resided 
in Ukraine. 
1. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, Religious Policy in the Era of Gorbachev, in 
RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION, 31-52, (S.P. Ramet ed., 1993). 
2. For example, the Soviet Act On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations, PRAVDA, 9 Oct. 1990, a t  2; 33 Journal of Church and State, 192-201 
(1991) (English translation of the act) [hereinafter USSR Actl, was followed by 
similar legislation in some subordinate republics: the Russian Republic adopted the 
Law On Freedom of Religion, RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion, JPRS-UPA-90- 
071, 18 Dec., 1990; the Ukrainian Republic adopted the Act of the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 
PRAVDA UKW, April 29, 1991, a t  3 [hereinafter Ukrainian Actl. Belarus' adopted 
the Law of Belarus' On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 
MINSK, NO. 2054-XII, Dec. 17, 1992, after the collapse and termination of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
3. For an analysis of this reaction in Russia, see W. Cole Durham, et  al., 
The Future of Religious Liberty in Russia, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1994); 
James E. Wood, Jr., The Battle Over Religious Freedom in Russia, 35 JOURNAL OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 491 (1993). 
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This essay analyzes the rise of freedom of conscience in 
Ukraine and the subsequent nationalist retreat from full 
religious liberty during the three-year period, 1991-1994. The 
"Law On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations" (1991), and the "Amendments of December 23, 
1993," will be examined together with the function of the 
Council for Religious Affairs of Ukraine during that period. 
These official Ukrainian materials will be evaluated by relating 
them to the provisions on religious liberty of several 
international treaties to which the Government of Ukraine is a 
~ignatory.~ 
I. THE UKRAINIAN RELIGIOUS MOSAIC AND THE SOVIET 
LEGACY 
The history of Ukrainian religiosity has been somewhat 
more complex than that of Russia. While Russian culture is 
historically associated with one dominant church, Ukrainian 
culture draws from several major traditional faiths: Russian 
Orthodoxy, an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and Greek 
Catholi~ism.~ 
The Russian Orthodox Church was historically the largest 
confession in Ukraine. The higher clergy was overwhelmingly 
Russian and this church was governed by the Patriarchate in 
- - - - -  
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Session, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPRI; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, (entered into force Sept. 
3, 1953), revised by Protocol Nos. 3 & 5 [hereinafter European Convention or 
ECHRI; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55.36, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 
51, U.N. Doc. A1RES136155 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration]; Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 [hereinafter 
Vienna Concluding Document]. The former Soviet Union ratified these treaties, as 
did its successor republics. See Durham, et  al., supra note 3, at  13; see also Centre 
for Human Rights, Status of International Instruments, at  27 (1987); Metodichni 
rekomendatsii, Rada u spravakh religii pri kabineti ministriv ukraini [Handbook of 
the Council for Religious Maim of Ukraine], Kiev, 1994, a t  99-100 [hereinaffer 
Handbook for Religious Affairs]. 
5. See Frank E. Sysyn, The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious 
Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in CHURCH, NATION, AND STATE 
IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 1 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 1991); Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, 
The Rise of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1919-1922, in CHURCH, 
NATION, AND STATE IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 228 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 1991); 
John-Paul Himka, The Greek Catholic Church in Nineteenth-Century Galicia, in 
CHURCH, NATION, AND STATE IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 52 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 
1991). 
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Moscow, beginning from the time of the political subordination 
of most of Ukraine to the Russian Tsarist empire in the 
seventeenth century. It is well to remember, however, that the 
Principality of Kiev had been the original center for the 
reception and spread of Orthodoxy throughout ancient Rus' 
from 988 A.D., and that it remained the center of Orthodoxy in 
the Russian lands until the rise of Muscovy in the late fifteenth 
century6 
The Russian Orthodox Church was the official state church 
of the Empire until the October Revolution of 1917. It suffered 
a heavy toll of political suppression during the Soviet era. All 
religious property was seized by the state in 1918, and only a 
fraction of it was provided for use by the Church.? A great 
number of cathedrals and churches were physically destroyed 
or converted to other social uses during the Stalin era? Many 
members of the clergy were arrested, imprisoned, and some 
were exe~uted.~ 
In an effort to enlist the propaganda efforts of the Church 
for the war effort against German fascism, Stalin came to an 
understanding with Russian Orthodoxy during World War 11, 
which resulted in a formal accommodation in 1944.1° The 
resulting partial "thaw" in church-state relations brought an 
end to the most blatant forms of persecution in the latter 
Stalin era and after the dictator's death, as a portion of 
Orthodox parishes were officially registered. 
The remaining members of the largely decimated clergy 
were, however, tightly subordinated to the Communist Party 
under the direction of the USSR Council for Religious AffBirs, 
throughout the remainder of the Soviet era." Formally 
subordinated to the USSR Council of Ministers, the Council for 
6. PAUL MILIUKOV, OUTLINES OF RUSSIAN CULTURE: PART I-RELIGION AND 
THE CHURCH 1-26 (1942); see also Orest Subtelny, UKRAINE, A HISTORY 30-39 (2d 
ed., 1995). 
7. See Philip Walters, A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy, in RELIGIOUS 
POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION 3-28 (Sabrina Ramet ed., 1993); see generally 
WILLIAM C. FLETCHER, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH UNDERGROUND (1971); 
GERHARD SIMON, DIE KIRCHEN IN RUSSLAND (1970); Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, The 
Survival of the Russian Orthodox Church in Her Millenial Centuly: Faith as  
Martyria in an  Atheistic State, in CHURCH, NATION, AND STATE IN RUSSIA AND 
UKRAINE 271 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 1991). 
8. Walters, supra note 7, a t  13-16. 
9. Id. 
10. See Ramet, supra note 1, a t  34. 
11. See Otto Luchterhandt, The Council for Religious Affairs, in RELIGIOUS 
POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION 55 (S.P. Ramet ed., 1993). 
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Religious Affairs (CRA) was the state arm of the Communist 
Party for controlling all legal religious activity. Its prior 
approval was necessary for the appointment of all Orthodox 
clergy and personnel. The CRA controlled the official 
registration and behavior of all recognized religious bodies. It 
was staffed by operatives of the K.G.B. (secret police) and its 
work was in close liaison with state security organs.'' During 
the Gorbachev era of greater "openness" (glasnost'), it was 
alleged in the press that the K.G.B. recruited operatives even 
among the higher clergy, one of whom was Metropolitan Filaret 
of Kiev, head of the Russian Orthodox Church in all of 
Ukraine. l3 
The Ukrainian Autocephalic (independent) Orthodox 
Church differed from the Russian Orthodox Church mainly in 
that it claimed independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, 
established the use of the Ukrainian language, and appointed 
Ukrainians, rather the traditional Russian prelates, to the 
higher clergy.14 Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodoxy was 
revived after the fall of Russian Tsarism in 1917, and 
developed rapidly during the 1920s into a major religious force 
in Ukraine. l5 
During Stalin's campaign against Ukrainian nationalism in 
the latter 1920s and early 1930s, the Autocephalic Church was 
suppressed through the arrest of clergy and other activists, the 
denial of access to churches, and a formal ban issued in 
1930.16 For more than a half century after its official banning 
by the Soviet regime, Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodoxy 
remained a significant underground "catacomb church" in 
Ukraine until it was again officially recognized in 1990, during 
Gorbachev's Perestroika. l7 
The western territories of Ukraine had a different political 
and religious history than those of the central and eastern 
regions of the country. Austrian and Polish rule of the western 
12. Id* 
13. Filaret resigned from his position to the Moscow Patriarchate without 
publicly confirming or denying these charges. See John B. Dunlop, KGB Subversion 
of Russian Orthodox Church, 1 RFEIRL RESEARCH REPORT, March 20, 1992, at 51- 
53; see also Patricia Herlihy, Crisis in Society and Religion in Ukraine, XIV 
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE 1, 4-6 No. 2 (April 1994). 
14. Bociurkiw, supra note 5, at 228-30. 
15. Id. See also Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, The Soviet Destruction of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church, 1929-1 936, 22 JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES 3, 3-21 (1987). 
16. Id. 
17. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 33-46; Herlihy, supra note 13, at 11. 
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territories brought a strong Catholic influence to Ukrainians 
residing in that region. Originally most of these Ukrainians 
were Orthodox, but after 1596, they were forcibly incorporated 
by Poland into Roman Catholic obedience.18 This Greek 
Catholic Church (sometimes referred to as the Uniate 
church)lg preserved an Orthodox Slavonic liturgy, but was 
made allegiant to the Pope in Rome. 
After the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 
eighteenth century, these territories came under Russian 
Tsarist rule, and the Greek Catholics were forcibly reabsorbed 
into the Russian Orthodox Church during the nineteenth 
century.20 The Greek Catholic Church made a considerable 
resurgence after western Ukraine became part of the 
reconstituted Republic of Poland at the end of World War I? 
Poland's second partitioning by Hitler and Stalin in 1939, 
placed western Ukraine under Soviet rule in the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic. Again the Greek Catholics were 
forcibly reabsorbed by the state into the Russian Orthodox 
Church in 1946, but continued to function as an underground 
"catacomb church" until official recognition was granted in 
1 9 9 0 . ~ ~  
Gorbachev's more liberal policy toward religious groups 
stimulated underground communicants of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalic Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church 
to boldly return to  public worship in 1989. In 1989-90, a 
number of officially Russian Orthodox parishes threw off their 
subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate and announced their 
adherence to the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox 
The Greek Catholics followed suit, seizing a major cathedral in 
L'viv. During the year 1989, alone, more than fifty additional 
parishes in western Ukraine transferred their allegiance from 
the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow to the Vatican in 
The Ukrainian government supported the official 
registration of a number of Russian Orthodox Churches during 
18. See Himka, supra note 5, at 57-59; Subtelny, supra note 6, at 92-102. 
19. See id. at 59. 
20. See id. at 60-64. 
21. Id. at 62-64; see also DONALD W. TREADGOLD, TWENTIETH CENTURY 
RUSSIA 25 (5th ed. 1981). 
22. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 34-46. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 38-43; see also Herlihy, supra note 13, at 4-6. 
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this period, but initially refused to accept petitions for the 
recognition of Ukrainian Autocephalic and Greek Catholic 
Churches. The Chairman of the Ukrainian Council for 
Religious Affairs even publicly claimed, erroneously, that only 
Russian Orthodox believers were making requests for the 
registration of churches, asserting that no other petitions had 
been received.25 Several major public demonstrations by 
Ukrainian Autocephalic and Greek Catholic believers then 
occurred in cities of western Ukraine, involving hundreds of 
thousands of  participant^.^^ After Gorbachev's meeting with 
Pope John Paul I1 in the Vat i~an ,~ '  and the adoption of the 
USSR Freedom of Conscience Law in 1990, the Greek Catholic 
and Autocephalic Churches were finally legally registered in 
Ukraine.28 
The rise of nationalism in Ukraine during the last years of 
Perestroika resulted in the splitting of the Russian Orthodox 
Church into two new schismatic churches. Both assumed the 
title: "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," but one remained affiliated 
with the Moscow Patriarchate and subject to its veto, while the 
other organized a totally independent Kiev Patriarchate as its 
head.29 The Autocephalic Orthodox Church refused union with 
the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate), in 
part, because the alleged former KGB spy, Metropolitan 
Filaret, had become a major figure in the latter.30 
This meant that there were now three Orthodox Churches 
and one reconstituted Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, each 
bitterly contesting the claims of the others for jurisdiction over 
parishes, disputing the use and future control of church 
buildings and other property. The vigorous opposition of the old 
Russian Orthodox Church to the legal recognition of these rival 
confessions, combined with the previously described public 
social protest mobilized by the other major churches, resulted 
in an atmosphere of considerable religious a n t a g ~ n i s m . ~ ~  This
was only heightened by the expectation that the government 
would soon redistribute properties previously appropriated by 
25. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 34 (citing Keston News Service). 
26. Id. at 43-52. 
27. See id. at 36. 
28. See id. at 43. 
29. See Herlihy, supra note 13, at  8-9. 
30. Id. at  8-9. 
31. Id. at  8-9; see also Ramet, supra note 1, at  43-52. 
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the Soviet regime. Tension mounted as each denomination laid 
claim to disputed properties.32 
In addition to the contending traditional churches, several 
small Protestant Churches had existed in Ukraine fiom the 
late nineteenth century: Evangelical Christians and Baptists, 
who combined into one denomination during the Soviet era, 
and the Ad~en t i s t s .~~  Some Evangelical Christian Baptist 
congregations were registered during the Soviet era, although a 
schismatic Baptist "Initsiativniki" sect was considered illegal 
due to its unwillingness to follow the restrictive laws of the 
Soviet government .34 A few Adventist congregations also 
functioned with state registration in Ukraine during the Soviet 
period. 
Following the adoption of the USSR Freedom of Conscience 
Law in 1990, a number of smaller confessions achieved legal 
recognition in Ukraine. In addition to the Evangelical Christian 
Baptists and Adventists, they included the Latin-rite Roman 
Catholic Church, Pentacostals, Methodists, Lutherans, The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), The 
Church of Christ (Campbellites), Jewish synagogues, Jehovah's 
Witnesses, The Unification Church of the Reverend Moon, 
Islamic sects, Baha'i, and Hare Krishna, among others.35 A 
few illegal or semilegal offshoot sects fiom Orthodoxy also 
operated in Ukraine, the most notorious of which was "The 
White Brotherhood," which was suppressed by police action in 
the summer of 1993, following doomsday threats of mass 
ritualistic suicides.36 
In summary, the Ukrainian religious mosaic has been one 
of an increasing pluralism of faiths. Both Tsarist and Soviet 
governments sought to forcibly reduce or eliminate religious 
pluralism by suppressing major alternatives to the Russian 
Orthodox Church, although a few small sects were tolerated a t  
a minimal level. Gorbachev's Perestroika not only restored 
32. A most prominent example of this was the prolonged month long sit-in 
that we witnessed at the front gate of the famous Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev 
during the winter of 1992. 
33. See CHRISTEL ANE, CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION 146-48 
(1978); Gerhard Simon, Staatlicher Druck under Kirchlicher Widerstand. Die 
Abgespaltene Baptistische Gruppe der Sogenannten Initsiatiwniki, OSTEUROPA, 
S ~ A R T ,  July 1969, at 503-04. 
34. LANE, supra note 33, at 146-48. 
35. Ramet, supra note 1, at 43-52. 
36. AX. Vladimirov, Byeloe bratstv+'ostanny den' prikhoditi [The White 
Brotherhood-The 'Last Day' Arrives], HOLOS UKRAINY, KIEV, July 13, 1993, at 3. 
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religion to a position of social respectability for the first time 
since 1917, but the "Law On Freedom of Conscience" of 1990, 
was the first legislative enactment genuinely establishing 
religious liberty in the history of the Eastern Slavic peoples. 
Perestroika leR a legacy to post-Soviet Ukraine of the full legal 
recognition of religious pluralism. 
As already shown, however, the Ukrainian reality a t  the 
demise of the Soviet Union was of a rapidly increasing 
pluralism of religious confessions in which serious unresolved 
antagonisms remained among the major churches. It was 
feared that religious conflict might reinforce existing regional 
cleavages in Ukraine, as the Russian Orthodox Church was the 
major confession in the eastern russified areas, the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church was strong in Kiev and the center, and the 
Greek Catholic and Autocephalic Churches were predominant 
in the western territories. 
The enactment by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the "Law 
On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" in 
1990, was followed by corresponding legislation in some of the 
constituent republics.37 In Kiev, the Supreme Soviet of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic enacted a "Law On 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" on April 
23, 1991, which followed the main provisions of the All-Union 
Law, but also sought to address the unique problems of the 
Ukrainian religious mosaic discussed above. This law was 
retained by the new Republic of Ukraine after independence 
was proclaimed and the USSR was dismantled at  the end of 
1991.~~ 
Like its precursor at  the all-union level, the Ukrainian 
Law of April 23, 1991, was an historic charter on freedom of 
conscience for all perspectives regarding religion, although, as 
will be shown, it was not without flaws. Its main provisions 
will be compared to the standards on religious liberty of several 
international human rights treaties to which Ukraine is a 
~ignatory.~' 
The act defines freedom of conscience as follows: 
37. See supra note 2. 
38. Id. 
39. See sources cited supra note 4. 
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All citizens shall have the guaranteed right of freedom of 
conscience. The above right shall include the freedom to have, 
to adopt and to change religion or convictions at one's own 
choice and the freedom to profess individually or together 
with other persons any religion or to profess no religion, to 
establish religious cults, to express openly and to spread 
freely one's own religious or atheistic  conviction^.^^ 
The above provisions of the Ukrainian Act appear to be in 
compliance with Article 9 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and ~reedoms;~ and with Article 
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
~ i g h t s ? ~  in all respects except for one important exception. 
These international human rights treaties, to which Ukraine is 
a signatory, begin with the phrase: "Everyone has the right," 
whereas the Ukrainian Law uses the much less inclusive 
phrase: "All citizens shall have the right."" 
The official handbook used by The Council for Religious 
Mairs  during the years, 1991-1994, claimed that "freedom of 
conscience is guaranteed in Ukraine to anybody who stays on 
its territory irrespective of the period of ~tay. '"~ While this is 
what the 1991 law ought to say in order to be compatible with 
international human rights commitments, i t  is not how the text 
actually reads. The inadvertent or intentional exclusion of 
noncitizens from the full rights and freedoms of the Act is a 
serious flaw, and particularly so when considering the 
amendments to the Act which were passed on December 23, 
1993, which will presently be considered. 
While granting freedom of conscience to all, the Ukrainian 
Act, like its all-union counterpart, established no dominant 
church or churches, nor did it employ the terms, "traditional" 
and %on traditional," in making any distinctions among 
 confession^.^^ As Article 5 declares: "All religions, faiths, and 
religious organizations shall be equal before the law. 
Establishment of any advantages or restrictions for one 
40. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 3. 
41. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 9U). 
42. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 18(1); see also ECHR, supra note 4, arts. 9-10; 
Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 14-15. 
43. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, arts. 1-4, 6, 23-24, 27-28. 
44. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 8. 
45. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, arts. 3, 5, 8. 
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religion, faith or religious organization to the prejudice of 
others shall be prohibited? 
In addition to the non establishment of any dominant 
church, there were provisions expressly separating church and 
state:? and separating the state educational system from the 
church.48 The Act also went so far as to explicitly prohibit 
government financing of bodies promoting, conducting, or 
opposing religion." 
The Law On the Freedom of Conscience envisages the state 
exercising benevolent neutrality toward legally equal religious 
bodies. In contrast to the old USSR Constitution of the 
Brezhnev era,50 Article 1 includes a recounting of "duties of 
the state to religious organizations," which precedes the stating 
of duties of religious organizations to the state and society.51 
One of these enumerated state "duties" is to "overcome the 
negative consequences of state policy with respect to religion 
and church" of the previous Soviet era.52 In this connection, 
religious bodies are granted the right to make claims for the 
return of properties formerly appropriated by the state.53 The 
Act also makes voluntary contributions and other acquired 
income of religious organizations tax exempt, except revenues 
derived from profit-making economic  enterprise^.^^ 
The liberating of religious association from state 
domination in Ukraine is further indicated by the provision 
which frees a local "religious community," (parish or 
congregation) from the obligation to notify state authorities of 
its e~tabl ishment .~~ This conforms to Principle 16(d) of the 
Vienna Concluding Document of the conferen& on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe that were promulgated in 1989.~~ 
Prescribed procedures for official registration by the state are 
necessary, according to the Ukrainian Act, for the religious 
46. Id. art. 5. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. art. 8. 
49. Id. art. 5. 
50. Konstitutsiia SSSR [Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics] (1977). For an English translation see DONALD D. BARRY AND CAROL 
BARNER-BARRY, CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS app. A (3d ed. 1987). 
51. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 1. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. art. 17. 
54. Id. 18-19. 
55. Id. art. 8. 
56. Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 4, princ. 16(d). 
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community to become a "legal person," entitled to enter into 
contracts or legally binding actions, such as the sponsoring of 
visas for foreign visitors.57 A decision by the state respecting 
an application for official registration must be rendered within 
30 days. Denial of registration must be justified in writing and 
this decision may be appealed to the courts.58 
The Ukrainian Act legitimized the actions of a number of 
religious communities that had changed affiliation from the 
Russian Orthodox Patriarchate to the Greek Catholic Church 
or the Autocephalic Orthodox Church, in spite of the protests 
from the Russian Church. "The state shall recognize the right 
of a religious community to be subordinate in canonical 
organizational matters to any religious center (administration) 
acting either in the Ukrainian SSR or beyond its boundaries 
and to change such subordination at  its own dis~retion."~~ 
Religious bodies are empowered by the Act to own property, 
printing establishments, and economic productive enterprises 
(such as a farm); to operate charities, seminaries, monasteries, 
and retreats; and to conduct religious e d u ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  Individual 
believers are assured the right, as parents or legal guardians, 
to bring up their children in their own religious values.61 
These expanded rights and powers conform to the provisions 
for protecting religious liberty specified in the Vienna 
Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.62 
Such individual and organizational rights were also 
extended to international relations by Article 24 of the original 
1991 Act without any significant restrictions. "Religious 
organizations and believers shall have the right either 
individually or together with others to establish and maintain 
international relations and direct personal contacts."63 
Participants going and coming have the right "to carry with 
them religious literature and other information materials of 
religious content." Religious organizations were assured the 
right "to send citizens abroad to study at clerical institutions 
Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 8. 
Id. arts. 24-25. 
Id. art. 8. 
Id. arts. 6, 10, 17-20, 22-23. 
Id. art. 3. 
Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 4, princs. 16(a-k). 
Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 24. 
332 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
and receive foreign citizens for similar purposes."64 The 
revision of Article 24 was the main objective of the 
amendments of December 23, 1993, which will be examined 
below. 
The Act specifies that religious organizations with 
"governing centers" abroad may freely carry out their activities 
in Ukraine if they do not breach Ukrainian legi~lat ion.~~ 
Agreements are to be made between the state and these foreign 
religious centers, and their activities are expected to conform to 
such agreements? 
The Act also provides for the dissolution of religious 
communities by their members. In very terse language, Article 
16 originally provided for the termination of religious 
communities also "by j~dgernent . '~~ This implies judicial 
decision, but no process or appeal procedure is outlined. The 
amendment of this article in December 1993, will also be 
discussed below. 
Although greatly enlarging the breadth of religious 
activity, the Act also specifies some restrictions. First, Article 3 
declares that the manifesting of religious convictions is subject 
to those restrictions "necessary for the protection of public 
security and order, life, health and morality as well as the 
rights and fkeedoms of other citizens."68 This has some 
similarity to provisions of international human rights 
documents, but is a somewhat more vague formulation of 
permissible state restrictions. 
Article 9(2) of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Freedoms is identical to Article 18(2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
providing that "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. n69 
64. Id. 
65. Id. art. 9. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. art. 16. 
68. Id. art. 3. 
69. European Convention, supm note 4, art. 9(2); ICCPR, supm note 4, art. 
18(2). 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN UKRAINE 
As Durham, Homer, van Dijk, and Witte have pointed out, 
the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this to 
mean that any interference with religious liberty must be 
motivated "by a pressing social need, and must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." State interference 
should be no greater than necessary and should utilize the 
Yeast intrusive means po~sible."'~ This more restrictive 
language might have improved the Ukrainian provision in 
protecting against the possibility of administrative abuse. 
The second restriction is mentioned in Article 5. "No 
religious organization shall intervene in activities of other 
religious organizations, carry out any kind of preaching of 
hostility, intolerance to disbelievers and believers of other 
faiths."" The inclusion of this provision is understandable 
given the religious conflict during the Gorbachev era, but it is 
unfortunately very vague. There is no clear definition of what 
constitutes hostility or intolerance. Does, for example, the 
teaching of one of the Orthodox Churches that it alone is the 
"true Orthodox faith," and that other churches have "departed 
from correct teachings and proper authority," constitute 
"hostility" or "intolerance?" If so, probably all confessions would 
be guilty of breaching the law. If hostility means something 
beyond the expression of doctrinal disagreement, then this 
needs to be specified. The failure to do so leaves the door open 
for selective administrative abuse of nontraditional, politically 
unpopular confessions. 
A third restriction is mentioned in Article 4. No one may 
"evade the fulfillment of duties established by the 
Constitution," by reference to religious convictions, although 
specific legislation can provide "the substitution of the 
fulfillment of one duty for another by reason of one's 
~onvictions."'~ A separate law, for example, provides 
alternative service for conscientious objectors to military 
service on religious gr~unds.'~The freedom of conscience of 
minorities might have been more adequately safeguarded, 
however, if some more encompassing statement had been 
entrenched in this basic law rather than depending on 
additional specific legislation as each case arises. 
70. Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 16-17. 
71. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 5. 
72. Id. 
73. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 14. 
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The Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations contains additional provisions designed to 
control and mediate religious conflict which deserve analysis. 
Article 17 invests the executive committees of regional 
governments with the responsibility of resolving disputes 
concerning the "possession or use of cult buildings and 
property."74 The decisions of these bodies can be appealed in 
the "Any unauthorized seizure of cult buildings or 
appropriation of cult property shall be pr~hibi ted."~~ 
The main device of the Act for preventing religious conflict 
from reinforcing regional political conflict is to deny religious 
organizations the right to participate in political affairs.77 
"Religious organizations shall not take part in activities of 
political parties and shall not support them financially, shall 
not nominate persons as their candidates to the state bodies of 
power, shall not carry out agitation or financing of election 
campaigns of any candidates to the said bodies."78 
This is not, however, a complete ban on personal political 
activity. Article 5 permits priests and clerics to "take part in 
political life to the same extent as all citizens," but not as 
representatives of religious bodies.7g Religious bodies are also 
assured of the right "to take part in social life and to use mass 
media to the same extent as social organizations," except 
(presumably) to participate in political  campaign^.^' 
Perhaps the most significant departure of the Ukrainian 
Act from the original USSR Act, was in its retaining of a fairly 
significant regulatory role for the State Council for Religious 
Mairs.  Since the Council for Religious Affairs had been a 
Soviet device for state suppression of freedom of conscience, the 
USSR Act in Moscow reduced the role of this agency to 
providing information and assistance to religious communities, 
and helping them establish international ties.81 The Russian 
Republic Freedom of Conscience Law in 1990, went even 
further, totally abolishing the Council for Religious 
74. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 17. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. art. 5 .  
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. USSR Act, supra note 2, arts. 12, 24. 
82. Cfi USSR Act, supra note 2 with RSFR Law On Freedom of Religion, 
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The Ukrainian Act, however, presemed the Council for 
Religious Affairs, no doubt because of the perceived need to 
monitor and ameliorate the conflicts which existed among 
major  confession^.^^ The resolution of conflicts among 
religious organizations and control over their adherence to the 
Act was give to "local city councils and their executive 
 committee^."^^ The Act assigns the Council for Religious 
Affairs to assist local government bodies "to ensure the state 
policy in respect of religions and the church."85 
In addition to information and assistance functions, the 
Council for Religious Affairs is to "carry out the registration of 
the charters of religious organizations . . . as well as the 
amendments and supplements to such charters."86 The 
Council for Religious Affairs used this power over registration, 
together with its control over information, in the early 1990s to 
gradually regain the traditional regulatory power over religious 
bodies that it had enjoyed during the Soviet period, as will be 
shown below. The decision, therefore, to preserve a fairly 
strong Council for Religious Affairs, as I shall show in Part IV, 
worked toward the gradual reduction of religious autonomy 
from the state. 
On balance, the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations was an historic achievement in the 
establishment of human liberty in Ukraine, although, as I have 
shown, it was not without significant weaknesses. The Act 
created legal circumstances which promoted the rapid 
expansion of religious activity and the proliferation of many 
new confessions. 
111. RISING PLURALISM, NATIONALISM, AND THE 1993 
AMENDMENTS 
The collapse of communism was accompanied by a 
widespread spiritual crisis which led many people in the former 
Soviet Union to undertake a search for religious values.87 In 
Ukraine, a number of people returned to some version of the 
supra note 2. 
83. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 30. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Lyudmila Vorontsova & Sergei Filatov, Religiosity and Political 
Consciousness in Post Soviet Russia, 22 RELIGION, STATE, AND SOClETY 397, 399- 
401 (1994). 
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Orthodox religious heritage, although the splintering of the 
Church into separate antagonistic confessions confused and 
alienated a significant portion of the population? Others 
expressed keen disappointment in Orthodoxy after reading 
revelations in the press showing the close ties of the Church to 
the Communist Party and secret police during the Soviet 
era?' 
This resulted in fairly weak public support for traditional 
Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Polls seem to indicate that personal 
religious belief grew rapidly among former citizens of the 
Soviet union, with an increasingly large group avoiding any 
denominational affiliation. Others took advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the Freedom of Conscience Law to 
investigate the newer, nontraditional faiths which were 
increasingly available through foreign evangelism. The 
Latinrite Catholic Church, a wide variety of Protestant 
evangelical groups, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (Mormons), Jehovah's Witnesses, the Unification Church 
of the Reverend Moon, Hare Krishnas, Islamic sects, Baha'i, 
the White Brotherhood, and others were active, quickly 
establishing groups of local  adherent^.^' 
The Council for Religious Affairs has estimated that on 
January 1, 1990, there were 6,000 local religious communities 
(registered parish associations) in Ukraine, but by January 1, 
1994, there were 15,000.~~ The number of communities and 
the pluralism of denominations were both expanding rapidly. 
While constituting only a small fraction of the total population, 
(estimates indicate no more than I%), the newer confessions 
grew rapidly during the 1991-94 period. Significant foreign 
evangelical support was given for such activities as evangelistic 
crusades,  lectures, conferences, media advertising, 
humanitarian service, literature, and missionaries. 
Leading prelates of the Orthodox Churches of Eastern 
Europe and the new states of the former Soviet Union began to 
publicly speak out during 1992-93, opposing the international 
missionary support for the newer  confession^.^^ These appeals 
88. Id. at 401. 
89. Id. 
90. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 43-52; Vorontsova & Filatov, supra note 87, 
at 99-101. 
91. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
92. See Wood, supra note 3, at 499-500; see also Natsionalnost' i religii, 
m V D A  UKRAWII, Aug. 14, 1992, at 3. 
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received favorable attention from some nationalists who 
enjoyed positions of political influence in Ukraine.93 
The political legitimacy of post-Soviet Ukraine, like that of 
the other successor states of former USSR, is strongly 
associated with the task of restoring a traditional national 
culture, long suppressed within a multinational empire. The 
state was considered to have the task of restoring the 
predominance of Ukrainian language, history, music, art, and 
other traditional cultural institutions that had been suppressed 
by Russian Tsarism and the Soviet regime. 
Traditional religious institutions were among these 
casualties of the Soviet period, and some nationalists viewed 
the state as having the obligation to restore historically 
dominant faiths that had been decimated by the communists in 
order to bring about the spiritual renewal of Ukrainian society. 
The restoration of traditional faiths was now being threatened 
by the flowering of the strange new religions "imported from 
abroad," which were supported by the ample human and 
material resources of international evangelism. Those taking 
such a position believed that, to promote the reflowering of 
Ukrainian nationalism and spiritual renewal of society, the 
state should erect protective barriers against the importing of 
increased religious pluralism.94 
The problem for the nationalist religious agenda was that 
the Law On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations did not provide any legal basis for the selective 
fostering or restricting of personal or group religious activity 
domestically or internationally. As previously shown, this Act is 
a charter for the equal protection of all perspectives about 
religion. "All religions, faiths and religious organizations shall 
be equal before the law. Establishment of any advantages or 
restrictions for one religion, faith or religious organization to 
the prejudice of others shall be pr~hibited."~ 
In 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament established the 
powerful "Parliamentary Commission For Spiritual 
Enlightenment and Renewal of Society." Its official objective 
was to fulfill the task mentioned in Article 1 of the Law On 
Freedom of Conscience: to "overcome the negative consequences 
93. Id. 
94. Id.; cf. also John Anderson, RELIGION, STATE AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET 
UNION AND SUCCESSOR STATES 221 (1994). 
95. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art 5. 
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of the (past Soviet) state policy in respect to religion and 
society."96 
T h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  Commission on S p i r i t u a l  
Enlightenment and Renewal of Society demonstrated its 
commitment to the nationalist agenda by drafting and 
proposing some important amendments to the Law On 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which 
were adopted by the Parliament on December 23, 1993." 
President Leonid Kravchuk signed these amendments into law 
in January 1994.'~ 
The nationalist revision of the Freedom of Conscience Law 
in Ukraine did not involve a direct and wholesale attack on the 
egalitarian provisions of the original Act. The latter, more 
drastic strategy had been followed by the nationalists in 
Moscow, who sought to fundamentally change the Russian 
Freedom of Religion Law in the August 1993 amendments. The 
international uproar against the Russian amendments was 
sufficient to cause President Boris Yel'tsin to refuse to sign 
them, even though they had been passed overwhelmingly by 
the Russian Par l ia~nent .~~ 
The nationalist revision in Kiev was more adroit. The 
egalitarian principles of the original act did not need to be 
gutted to attain the nationalists' objective. Since the original 
Act granted freedom of conscience and manifestation of 
religious beliefs specifically "to citizens," all that the revisers 
felt needed to be done was to amend it to seriously restrict the 
religious freedom of "noncitizens" in Ukraine, and to prevent or 
drastically restrict the entry of human and material resources 
from abroad. Ukrainian officials could still claim, in their view, 
that its legislation maintains full freedom of conscience and 
equal religious liberty rights for all Ukrainian citizens, just as 
in the original 1991 Act. 
I shall argue that the effect of the 1993 Amendments to 
Article 24 and 16 is a significant reduction of religious freedom 
both for noncitizens and citizens in Ukraine. Furthermore, the 
restriction of religious rights for foreigners in Ukraine is an 
96. P .  Yefimov, Novaya kommissiya Radi, HOLOS U K R m ,  KIEV, Aug. 9, 
1992, at 3. 
97. P. Ivanenko, Novoe Zakorudatel'stvo o religii, HOLOS U-, KIEV, Dec. 
29, 1993, at 4-5. 
98. Novoe Zakonodatel'stvo o religii, HOLOS U r n ,  KIEV, Jan. 9, 1994, at 4.  
99. See Durham, et al., supm note 3, at 9-10. 
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equally serious violation of international human rights 
commitments as it is a reduction of citizen rights. 
A. The Amendment to Article 24 
As shown above, the original form of Article 24 offered no 
significant restrictions upon international religious relations or 
upon the religious activities of foreigners in Ukraine.'" The 
Amendment approved by the Ukrainian Parliament, however, 
involved a major curtailment of international religious contact: 
Clergymen, preachers of religion, instructors (teachers), and 
other representatives of foreign organizations who are foreign 
citizens temporarily staying in Ukraine, may preach religious 
dogmas, perform religious rites and practice other canonic 
activities only in those religious organizations on whose invi- 
tations they came, and upon an official agreement with the 
state body which has registered the statute of the corre- 
sponding religious organization. lo' 
The first thing to notice about the Amendment to Article 
24 is that it effectively bars entry of all foreign representatives 
of faiths that do not already exist as legal entities in Ukraine. 
This is the effect of the requirement that they must be person- 
ally invited by an already legally registered religious communi- 
ty, because no other confession is likely to extend such an invi- 
tation. This not only curtails the manifesting of religious beliefs 
by noncitizens in Ukraine, but also effectively prevents the 
access of Ukrainians to any totally new faith. 
This amendment seriously disadvantages foreigners in 
Ukraine, in comparison to citizens, in the exercise of religious 
liberty. As previously emphasized, all of the international hu- 
man rights instruments consistently require that the freedom 
of religion and expression be extended to all persons. The re- 
strictions on the right of foreigners to teach religious values or  
to perform religious rites in Ukraine is a considerable narrow- 
ing of the freedom of expression that they enjoyed before the 
amendment came into force, and is incompatible with a number 
of provisions of international human rights documents. lo2 
100. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 24. 
101. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 84-85. 
102. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts 18-19; ECHR, supra note 4, arts. 9-10; see also 
Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 14-15. 
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In addition, the Amendment to Article 24 also narrows the 
religious liberty of Ukrainian citizens. The International Cove- 
nant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees to all persons the 
"right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers."lo3 In excluding representatives 
of new faiths and in limiting the activities of those who can get 
into the country, the Amendment to Article 24 violates this 
provision, as well as Article 6 of the Ukrainian Act, which 
assures citizens full access to religious information and pro- 
claims "the right to study any religious teaching."lo4 It  may 
also be argued that since the newer confessions are dependent 
on the training and teaching help of foreign representatives, 
that the Amendment disadvantages them, thus violating the 
equal treatment provision of Article 5 of the Ukrainian Act.'" 
The second observation to be made about the Amendment 
to Article 24, is that it is designed to prevent any further geo- 
graphical expansion of religious work already established in 
Ukraine by foreign representatives of newer confessions, be- 
cause they can work only in the location of the already regis- 
tered religious group that officially invited them. Foreign reli- 
gious workers in Ukraine may not expand their activity to any 
new cities. The Council for Religious Affairs has confirmed this 
interpretation in its handbook on the Act.'06 This aspect of 
the Amendment also violates the same international human 
rights provisions and Articles of the 1991 Ukrainian Act as 
discussed above, inasmuch as it reduces the rights of both 
noncitizens to manifest their religious beliefs and limits the 
right of citizens to receive information about new faiths. 
Third, the Amendment is vague or ambiguous in saying 
that foreign teachers may preach or perform rites "only in 
those religious organizations on whose invitations they 
came."lo7 Does this mean that they may serve only in the city 
where the inviting organization exists, or does it mean that 
they may serve only on the premises of the building owned or 
rented by it for worship services? If the latter, more restrictive 
interpretation is adopted, foreign teachers are effectively de- 
103. ICCPR, supra note 4, art 19; see also 1981 Declaration, supra note 4, art. 
6. 
104. Ukrainian Act. supra note 2, art. 6. 
105. Id. art. 5. 
106. Handbook of Religious Maim, supra note 4, at 84-85. 
107. Id. 
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nied any public evangelical functions other than participating 
in worship services. The less restrictive interpretation would 
permit foreign teachers to teach within the city limits where 
the inviting organization operates, and would, therefore, allow 
evangelical work with people who are not members of the reli- 
gious community. 
This provision of the Amendment has been interpreted 
both ways by regional representatives of the Council for Reli- 
gious Affairs, and the official handbook says nothing to resolve 
the ambiguity.lo8 The more restrictive interpretation violates 
the provisions of international treaties by denying the right of 
noncitizens to spread their beliefs to  nonbeliever^.'^^ The less 
restrictive interpretation violates the same provisions discussed 
in the first two points. The fact that this provision is left am- 
biguous in the Amendment and in the interpretation by the 
Council for Religious Affairs is itself an uncertainty that re- 
stricts free expression in an unwarranted manner. 
Fourth, the invitation of the local religious community is 
not sufficient to obtain a visa for a foreign religious volunteer. 
The invitation must be approved by the regional or local gov- 
ernment body that registered the religious community. Denial 
of state approval of the invitation requires no explanation to 
the local church, and there is no appeal. In actuality, the Coun- 
cil for Religious Affairs controls this process through its region- 
al representative, whose recommendation to the regional gov- 
ernment is accepted as the will of a superior Republic level 
agency that is de facto as powerful as a central ministry.110 
The control over visas for foreign religious teachers is, 
therefore, totally in the hands of representatives of the Council 
for Religious AfYairs, who are free to implement their own 
agenda or their own personal prejudices. This provision reveals 
that the religious communities have no autonomy from the 
state whatsoever in the invitation of foreign citizens for reli- 
gious contacts under the Amendment. 
B. The Amendment of Article 16 
The Amendment to Article 16 also significantly weakens 
religious liberty in the Ukrainian Freedom of Conscience law. 
108. Id. 
109. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 9; ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 18. 
110. Interviews with CRA Regional Representatives in Donetsk (May 1993) and 
in Odessa and Simferopol (March 1994). 
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This article is concerned with procedures for terminating or 
discontinuing a legally established local religious organization. 
The original tersely worded Article 16 permitted the state 
to terminate a local religious association "by judgement," pre- 
sumably when its representatives breach the responsibilities 
required by the Act. The original article provided no judicial 
process or remedies or statement of cause. The Amendment 
also fails to outline judicial process or remedies, but expands 
causes for termination into a very extensive list of vaguely 
stated violations. 
The list of grounds for "terminating the activity of a reli- 
gious community" by the state are as follows: 
If it encourages religious hostility and hatred toward unbe- 
lievers and believers of other confessions; if it humiliates 
national dignity or insults the feelings of citizens on the basis 
of their religious convictions; if it compels citizens to confess 
or refuse to confess a particular religion, to participate or not 
participate in church services, religious rites and ceremonies, 
religious studies; if it causes harm to the health of citizens, 
licentiousness and other infringements upon personal dignity 
and rights of citizens under the pretext of performing reli- 
gious rites and ceremonies; if it systematically, flagrantly 
violates legal regulations regarding the performing of public 
church services, religious rites, ceremonies and processions; if 
it teaches citizens not to perform their constitutional obliga- 
tion, involving violations of civil order or infringement of 
rights and property of civil, state or religious organiza- 
tion~.~" 
None of these grounds are described in careful legal lan- 
guage. Such an exceedingly detailed, yet vaguely worded, 
amendment would seem to provide almost endless possibilities 
for administrative officials to bring charges against an unpopu- 
lar or unfavored religious body in court. Its effect is to impose a 
chilling restraint on the freedom of religious expression by 
comparison with the original 1991 Act. 
The Amendment specifies that charges may be brought by 
a prosecutor or the regional government that originally regis- 
tered the association. Yet regional governments came to depend 
on recommendations by representatives of the Council for Reli- 
gious Affairs during the 1991-94 period. The Amendment pro- 
111. Handbook for Religious Mairs, supra note 4, at 57-58. 
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vides no appeal or redress from the decision of the court. Once 
the court "terminates all its activity," the religious community 
has all of its assets appropriated by the state without compen- 
sation or appeal.ll2 The effect of such a draconian and vague- 
ly worded Amendment is to further reduce the autonomy and 
freedom of religious communities from the control of state ad- 
ministrators. 
To summarize, the 1993 Amendments effectively reduce 
the religious liberties originally provided under the Ukrainian 
Freedom of Conscience Law. They not only seriously disadvan- 
tage noncitizens in the manifesting of their religious beliefs, 
but they also diminish the right of freedom of information of 
religious seekers in Ukraine who desire alternatives to the 
traditional faiths. The disadvantaging of the newer religious 
bodies violates the "equal protection of all faiths and perspec- 
tives" of the Act. The expansion of vaguely worded grounds for 
the state liquidation of an unfavored religious body is a signifi- 
cant brake on freedom of expression. 
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS 
AFFAIRS 
As previously explained, the 1991 Act granted the Council 
for Religious Affairs powers to help "ensure the state policy re- 
specting religions,"ll3 that were greater than those provided 
in the USSR Act. Nowhere in the 1991 Act, however, was it 
anticipated that the Council for Religious Mairs  would again 
become the centralized powerful agency for controlling religious 
practice that it had been during the Soviet era. This is what 
the Council for Religious Affairs became, however, during the 
1991-94 period. 
In 1992, the Council for Religious Affairs was granted 
control over the registration of visas for foreign religious volun- 
teers by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'" The Office of Visa 
Registration (OVIR) acted only upon the approval of the Coun- 
cil.l15 The 1993 Amendments gave the Council for Religious 
Affairs de facto control also over the invitation process for the 
granting of visas, as explained above. 
112. Id. 
113. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 30. 
114. Interviews with representatives of the Office of Visa Registration, in Kiev, 
Ukraine (August 1992). 
115. Id. 
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By May 1993, the Republic Council for Religious Aff'airs 
had centralized its direction of regional representatives, so that 
its approval was necessary for their granting of registration of 
charters for religious communities applying for legal recogni- 
tion.ll6 The Council began also to direct regional representa- 
tives in the approval or denial of visa invitations for foreign 
religious workers, sometimes giving orders about which groups 
could invite foreign representatives and what the goals would 
be.'l7 There is some evidence that regional government repre- 
sentatives took direction from the Council and its regional 
representatives on religious questions much as they would from 
a regular Republic-level Ministry.l18 The broader and vaguer 
grounds for judicially liquidating unfavored religious bodies, 
contained in the Amendment to Article 16, gave the Council 
greater power to exercise discipline and control. 
The Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs was Mr. 
A. Zinchenko, who also was a deputy in Parliament until the 
election of 1994, and who was closely associated with the na- 
tionalists on the Commission for Spiritual Enlightenment and 
the Renewal of Society. The Council for Religious Affairs had 
achieved sufficient central control over the regulation of reli- 
gious bodies by 1993, that it was well suited to become the 
vehicle for implementing the new, more restrictive religious 
policy. 
No official data is available concerning the implementation 
of the 1993 Amendments by the Council for Religious Affairs. 
Religious leaders in various cities claimed, however, that there 
was a radical reduction in the granting and renewal of visas for 
foreign religious workers during the close of 1993 and the en- 
tire year of 1994.'" By June 1994, they claimed that foreign 
religious workers associated with evangelical work, humanitar- 
ian service, and leadership training in the newer confessions 
had been reduced to a very small number.120 
In the controversies between the major traditional church- 
es, the Council for Religious Affairs was accused by major rival 
prelates of favoring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev 
116. Interviews with CRA Regional Representatives, in Donetsk (May 1993) 
and Khar'kov (June 1993). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Interviews with religious leaders in Kiev, Donetsk, Khar'kov, Odessa, and 
Simferopol (February, March, May, and June 1994). 
120. Id. 
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Patriarchate) and of exercising too much authority over reli- 
gious life. Their recommendation to the Parliament was that 
the Council for Religious Affairs be abolished.l2' 
In the parliamentary elections of 1994, Chairman 
Zinchenko of the Council for Religious Affairs did not stand for 
reelection. In the Presidential Election Runoff in June 1994, 
President Kravchuk was defeated by Leonid Kuchma. One of 
the first acts of newly elected President Kuchma was to dis- 
band the Council for Religious Affairs, which was carried out 
on July 28, 1994.'~~ 
By the autumn of 1994, the administration of religious 
affairs had not been further clarified. By 1995, however, the 
Council for Religious Affairs had been reconstituted as an 
agency within the Ministry of C ~ 1 t u r e . l ~ ~  The nationalist poli- 
cy and the 1993 Amendments of the Freedom of Conscience 
Law had not, at  this writing, been reversed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Amendments of December 23, 1993, to the 1991 Ukrai- 
nian Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organiza- 
tions represent a policy of major retreat from full religious 
liberty for citizens and noncitizens alike. They represent an 
attempt to use the state to control the growth of the newer 
religious confessions in Ukraine, in response to appeals by 
Orthodox prelates in Ukraine and in various other countries. 
They represent a partial return to the historic Soviet and 
Tsarist practice of the state limitation of the expansion of reli- 
gious pluralism. 
The Amendments violate Ukraine's obligations under inter- 
national human rights treaties as well as the spirit and letter 
of the 1991 Act. Article 32 of the Law on Freedom of Con- 
science instructs the government that where Ukrainian legisla- 
tion contravenes the international treaties, "then the rules of 
the international treaty shall be applied."124 The Handbook of 
the Council for Religious Affairs supports this remedy: "In case 
121. Interview with prelate, in Kiev (June 1994); information confirmed by 
interview with Deputy of Parliament, in Kiev (June 1994) and also by interview 
with Professor of Jurisprudence, in Kiev (June 1994). 
122. News broadcast (Radio Ukraine, July 30, 1994). 
123. Reported in conversation with representatives of Baker & McKenzie Law 
Firm in Moscow and in Kiev (April 1995). 
124. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 32. 
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the legislation of Ukraine does not comply with some of [the 
international treaty] regulations, these regulations will be in 
force until the legislation of Ukraine is brought in correspon- 
dence with it."125 
In spite of the reining back of the Council for Religious 
Mairs,  the 1993 Amendments and the nationalist religious 
policy continue to stand in Ukraine. The inauguration of the 
new Kuchma Administration is a favorable moment for 
Ukraine to reverse the retreat from religious liberty that oc- 
curred from 1991-94. Article 32 of the 1991 Law should be 
invoked to bring Ukrainian legislation and religious practice 
into full conformity with the international human rights treaty 
obligations which the government of Ukraine has assumed. 
125. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 98-99. 
